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Abstract
Recreational users are one of the major causes of ecosystem damage in
publicly owned parks. To ensure the sustainability of these ecosystems requires
that the damage impact of recreational users be managed. A constrained park
management goal is proposed that allows recreational users to pursue welfare
derived from park experiences, subject to non-declining ecosystem health and
equity of access. Four guiding principles (adaptable community control, quantity
constraints, equity of access, and least cost policy mix) are used to provide a
framework for recreational user management in three groups of park ecosystem.
The funding of recreational user management is explored. Classifying park
ecosystems in to three groups, it was found that non-market mechanisms alone
are suitable in Group 1 park ecosystems, with market mechanisms being of
increasing importance use in Group 2 and Group 3 park ecosystems.
Keywords: Park management; recreational users; sustainability; market and
non-market mechanisms
51.Introduction
“[A]lmost 5 percent of world’s land mass is now either totally or partially
protected as parks and reserves, not including Antarctica” (The World
Resources Institute, 1992, pp. 297). The total area protected is larger than this
for the above figure includes neither marine sites, locally or provincially protected
parks and reserves nor those sites less than 1000 hectares in area. Parks and
reserves form an important part of the world’s natural capital, especially as much
of the ecosystems they contain exist in a natural state. The management of these
natural capital assets is important if sustainability is to be assured.
Recreational users are one of the major causes of local and wide-scale
ecosystem damage in publicly owned parks (Hammitt and Cole, 1987). To
ensure the sustainability of these ecosystems requires that the damage impact
of recreational users be managed. To this end, this paper suggests a
management goal for ‘publicly owned parks and reserves’ (referred to as parks
from here on) and a set of guiding principles that are grounded in an ecological
economic approach to sustainability, and examines the implication of this
approach for recreational user management.
A constrained park management goal is developed in Section 2, based on the
hierarchical problems that Costanza (1995) suggests need to addressed for
sustainability. Four guiding principles are developed in Section 3 to provide a
framework for recreational user management. Section 4 examines the
appropriate scale of use of parks by relating a measure of ecosystem health with
the sources of the detrimental impact on ecosystems in parks attributable to
recreational users. Section 5 classifies park ecosystems into three groups for
the purpose of recreational user management. The guiding principles are used
in Section 6 to explore the types of policies appropriate for recreational user
management in the three park ecosystems identified in Section 5. Conclusions
are drawn from a summary in Section 7.
2.A park management goal for sustainability
Costanza (1995) notes that sustainability requires ecological economics to
address the three hierarchical problems of: (1) determining and ensuring that the
scale of human activities are ecologically sustainable; (2) distributing resources
within and between generations of humans and other species with due regard for
equity; and (3) efficiently allocating the resources constrained by (1) and (2). It is
also clear that policy options that arise from addressing these problems need to
be delivered via effective institutions. This section employs this approach to
sustainability to develop a management goal for parks.
Costanza and Patten (1995 pp. 195) give the definition of a sustainable
system as “one that attains its full expected life span within the nested hierarchy
of systems within which it is embedded.” To attain an expected life span it is
important that the health of a system is maintained in a state of good health. It
follows that the non-declining health of the park ecosystem is an appropriate
practical sustainability constraint for recreational user management. This
constraint addresses the first of Costanza’s (1995) hierarchical problems. It can
also be argued that this constraint is appropriate from the ethical position that
the community as a whole inherits an ecosystem and has an obligation to pass it
to the community of the future in at least as good a state of health as it was
inherited. By preserving the health of the park ecosystem, this constraint also
addresses the between human generations equity issue and the between
6humans and other species equity issue, that form part of the second of
Costanza’s hierarchical problems.
If it is recognised that ecosystems generally, and especially publicly owned
ecosystems within parks, are the common inheritance of all, it follows that a
second constraint for recreational user management should be that usage is not
determined by income level. This addresses the within human generational
equity issue component of Costanza’s second hierarchical problem.
I therefore suggest the following constrained goal for the management of parks
that addresses the first two of Costanza’s hierarchical problems: recreational
users may pursue welfare derived from park experiences, subject to an
ecosystem sustainability constraint of non-declining ecosystem health, and an
equity of access constraint.
3.Guiding principles for recreational user management
To achieve the constrained management goal established in Section 2, I
suggest the following four guiding principles for the management of recreational
users in parks: (1) ‘Adaptable community control’ to address the issue of
effective institutional arrangements; (2) ‘Quantity constraints’ to address the
issue of appropriate scale, contained in the first constraint on the management
goal; (3) ‘Equity of access’ to address the equity constraint on the management
goal; (4) ‘Least cost policy mix’ to address the efficiency considerations in
achieving the management goal. These guiding principles will now be
elaborated.
Guiding principle 1: Adaptable community control
As with any management system, it is important that the institutional
arrangement within which recreational users are managed is capable of
effectively and efficiently achieving the management goals.
To pursue goals effectively requires that the managing body has the power to
implement goal-orientated policies. In a liberal democracy this power is afforded
to the managing body by the broad community if the goal being pursued is
considered worthwhile, and if the managing body is determined to be bona fide.
The management goal outlined in Section 2 is legitimate if the community seeks
to achieve a scale of human activity in parks that is ecologically sustainable. I
suggest that the managing body should be under community control. This stems
from the ethical position that the community as a whole inherits parks and
therefore should be responsible for their management.
It is envisioned that all parks would be managed under the control of an
integrated network of local, regional, national and international ‘Park
Management Boards’ comprised of representatives from the stakeholder
groups: children, for they are “natural representatives of the future” (d’Arge, 1994
pp. 125, who goes on to advocate that children should be given “complete
ownership rights of all natural species”); indigenous peoples, for they possess
specific local knowledge of ecosystems; recreational users groups, for the
compliance by users with decisions made by the Boards will be increased if they
part-own the Boards’ decisions, and if those decisions are considered
acceptable and legitimate (see Hanna, 1995 for a discussion of the benefits of
user participation in natural resource management); concerned community
groups; individuals. It is also important to include representatives of the park
authorities for they are specifically responsible of the enactment of the Boards’
decisions on a daily basis.
7Information regarding the past, and likely future trends in factors affecting
ecosystem health and recreational user impact on ecosystem health needs to be
effectively communicated to the Boards to allow appropriate management
decisions to be made.
To manage recreational users efficiently requires the managing body to
choose, on the basis of least cost, between alternative policies that are
perceived capable of delivering the management goal.
Adaptable management is an important aspect of recreational user
management, in the face of changes in the factors that affect the health of the
ecosystem and the evolution of management techniques.
Guiding principle 2: Quantity constraints
The reader will recall from Section 2 that the proposed goal for park
management is constrained to ensure non-declining ecosystem health. This
requires the following data. (1) The current state of health of the park ecosystem,
relative to previous periods. (2) The scale of the detrimental impact by human on
an ecosystem in the current period, and the factors that cause the detrimental
impact. The former is required to determine whether the constraint is being met,
and implies that ecosystem health can be measured. If the constraint is not being
met, the latter is required to effectively manage the level of the detrimental
impact by recreational users on the park ecosystem.
If there exists a downward trend in the measure of ecosystem health the setting
of upper quantity limits within which users of an ecosystem can interact with the
ecosystem are required. This implies that a quantity constraint on the detrimental
human impact on an ecosystem in the current period is required. It should be
recognised that given uncertainty as to the working of ecosystems any working
value for these quantity constraints should err on the low side.
Section 4 notes an approach for measuring ecosystem health, and considers
the factors that determine the scale of detrimental impacts of recreational users.
Guiding principle 3: Equity of access
To address the within (human) generational equity issue of access to parks, a
constraint to the proposed park management goal, this guiding principle
acknowledges that park ecosystems are the common inheritance of all, and
hence, the enjoyment of parks should not be elitist with income the determinant
ability to access parks. I suggest that the major implication of this guiding
principle is to allow minimal impact uses in parks to be undertaken at no direct
access charge to the individual.
Minimal impact uses are activities that cause the least detrimental impact
upon the ecosystem, undertaken using techniques that cause the least
detrimental impact upon the ecosystem. This concept is explored further in
Section 4. It should be noted that this guiding principle should not take
precedence over, nor deny, the rights of traditional indigenous peoples.
It could be argued that it is appropriate to charge all users, including those
pursuing minimal impact uses, the administrative cost of their use that arise from
admittance to site and provision of information regarding walking tracks, etc.
Such a charge would seem appropriate. However, this should be seen as
distinct from charging on a full user-pays basis, that covers all management
costs of minimal impact uses. To do this would violate the spirit of this guiding
principle.
8This guiding principle suggests that the majority of funding would need to be
appropriated from sources other than from recreational users undertaking
minimal impact uses. These sources of funds can be split into four categories:
(1) recreational users of parks pursuing non-minimal impact uses (to be
considered in Section 6); (2) non-recreational users of parks; (3) all resident and
non-residents that potentially benefit from parks; (4) other sources. The latter
three will be addressed here.
Two types of non-recreational user funding sources are worth noting. First, the
sale of native flora and fauna would provide such a revenue source. The harvest
level of the park ecosystem should be set to ensure profit maximisation,
provided the harvest is less than, or equal to, the maximum sustainable yield of
those species, and that the harvest does not detrimentally impact on ecosystem
health in the long run. When viewing ecosystems as a whole, it is important to
recognise the first of these constraints is not contained in the definition of the
latter. It is possible that the sustainable harvest of one species at a particular
level will alter the vigour, organisation or resilience of ecosystems (see
Costanza, 1992 for a discussion of these concepts), which may reduce
ecosystem health. The second source of funding from non-recreational users of
parks is from the various commercial enterprises that are given permission to
operate within parks. Auctioning leases and licences for the provision of various
facilities such as shops, guides, tour operators, camp site management would
ensure the maximum return from these operations.
Residents of a country communally own parks within their boarders. All are
likely to benefit from these parks directly, as potential recreational users, or
indirectly from the life support and biodiversity functions that park ecosystems
provide, or the existence or bequest values that arise from these natural capital
assets. A national hypothecated, that is ear-marked, progressive park
ecosystem tax, based on income and taxed at source would be an appropriate
vehicle for raising revenue from this funding source, being based upon ability to
pay. It is generally considered that hypothecation increases acceptability. Non-
resident visitors to a country are also expected to gain some of the same
benefits that residents gain. A hypothecated international traveller park
ecosystem tax charged at airports would be appropriate. This tax could either be
a unit tax or based upon length of stay.
Other funding sources would include donations and bequests to the Park
Management Board.
Guiding principle 4: Least cost policy mix
As there is an opportunity cost of financial resources for recreational
management, it is important these resources are not wasted through the
adoption of policies that are not least cost policies. A variety of policies will be
required for recreational user management, rather than a single policy. There are
three reasons for this. (1) Guiding principles 2 and 3 that relate to scale of use
and equity of access considerations, respectively, are constraints on the
proposed park management goal and therefore must be heeded. Each may
require separate policies. (2) Different least cost policies are likely to be
required for different types of park ecosystem. (3) For each park ecosystem type
there are likely to be different least cost policies for addressing specific aspects
of the management issue.
Section 6 will consider the least cost policy mix further.
94.Scale of use and the impact of recreational users
To provide an insight into the use of the guiding principles outlined in Section 3
for recreational user management in parks, this section addresses in detail
guiding principle 2: quantity constraints. First, one approach to measuring
ecosystem health is outlined, that advanced by Costanza (1992)1. To be an
effective constraint on the park management goal, the quantification of
ecosystem health is essential. Second, an approach to measuring the
detrimental impact of recreational users on ecosystems is introduced.
Costanza (1992) suggested a practical definition of ecosystem health that can
be employed to direct public policy and ecosystem management. Costanza’s
ecosystem health index (H) is a multiplicative function: H=G*O*R2, where G is
vigour (eg. net primary product), O is a zero to one index of the ecosystem’s
organisation, and R is a zero to one index of ecosystem resilience. Network
analysis and simulation modelling are advocated by Costanza as suitable
approaches for quantifying the organisation and resilience indices.
Only if there is a downward trend in H should the management of the factors
affecting H be considered, else financial resources are wasted. It should be
noted that recreational users are not the only cause of a decline in H. Non-native
species, pollution, non-recreational users and natural ecosystem cycles
(described by Holling, 1995) all affect H. If it is established, via measurement or
expert judgement, that recreational users are in part or fully responsible for the
decline in H then the management of their impact on ecosystem health is
appropriate.
An impact identity equation, analogous to the famous ‘I=PAT’ identity of
Ehrlich and Holdren (1971), can be used to conceptualise factors which affect
the detrimental impact on a park ecosystem in the current period (I) of
recreational users.
I=P*V*T
where P is the user population in the current period, V is the number of visits
per capita of the user population in the current period, T is the quantity of
damage done to the ecosystem, due to the technology employed, per visit in the
current period.
Meadows (1995) noted that although the I=PAT formula provides a lens
through which to see the environmental situation, the formula has been criticised
for not making explicit which factors influence the variables on the right hand side
of the equation. Effective recreational user management policy suggestions
require that this criticism be explicitly addressed when considering I=P*V*T.
Over time P and V have tended to increase. For example, over the five years
to 1993, there was growth in visitor numbers at almost all World Heritage sites,
with approximately 40 million visitors to sites in 1993 (The World Heritage
Centre, 1994). T has increased in recent years with the introduction of such
technology as off-road recreational vehicles and mountain bikes on natural land
forms, and speed boats and jet-skis to waterways for recreational use. It is
therefore of no surprise that I has increased, and is likely to increase in the future.
This suggests that, if not addressed, park ecosystem health will reduce in the
future. However, it is also possible to allow P and V to increase, while reducing I,
through addressing ways in which T can be reduced. T can be thought of as:
T=f(A, Q, S, W).
                                                
1 For a discussion of other measures of ecosystem health see Hannon (1992).
2 G rather than Costanza’s V is used here to denote vigour, for V is used latter in the article.
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A is a malignancy index of the detrimental impact on the park ecosystem of
activities (eg. camping, recreational fishing and hunting, four-wheel driving,
walking) pursued per visit, aggregated across park users. A variety methods for
determining such an index could be developed and employed, that vary in their
data requirements and crudeness. At one extreme, an index could be
constructed based upon expert opinion of the detrimental impact on park
ecosystems of the activities recently undertaken in the park. At the other
extreme, an index could be based upon detailed sampling of the impact on
biophysical indicators of the activities recently undertaken in the park. The
indicator measures could include, for example, compaction, loss and gullying of
soil, disturbance of species and habitat, vegetation loss, tree damage, root
exposure, spread of weeds, etc. (see Hammitt and Cole, 1987 and Turner, 1994
for discussion of methods for measuring the impact of various recreational
activities).
Q is a malignancy index of the detrimental impact on the ecosystem of the
techniques employed per activity, aggregated across park users. To pursue
camping as an activity, for example, there exists a number of possible
techniques (eg. fires used, stoves only, no flames). This index could use the
same measurement approaches as those suggested for determining A, but as
relate to the variety of techniques employed per activity.
S is an index of the level of ‘stress’ upon the park ecosystem at the beginning
of the period, which could be based on a weighted decay function of the
cumulative number of periods in which Ht-1 < Ht-2, where Ht-1 is the level of
Costanza’s (1992) ecosystem health index in the previous period (see Holdren
et al., 1995 for an alternative proxy for stress).
W is an ‘awareness’ index that reflects recreational user’s awareness of the
nature and health of the ecosystem, and the need for recreational user
management. The ‘awareness’ index could be a weighted inverse function of V,
and to a lesser extent P, and a positive function of the quantity of effective on-site
and off-site education of recreational users toward behaviour that reduces I. A
crude proxy for the latter is the expenditure on recreational user education.
The reader will have noted that the impact equation can be used to manage
users of other ecosystems, such as commercial fisheries or forestry.
A reduction in T, and hence I, occurs when A, Q and S are reduced and when
W is increased. The development and use of policies to influence T, P and V will
be explored in Section 6. First, Section 5 will consider a range of ecosystems
types for the purposes of recreational user management.
5.Ecosystem classification
For the purposes of management, ecosystems can be classified into three
groups by consideration of ecological importance and reversibility if lost. This
follows the approach by King (1994) to natural capital classification. At one
extreme there are ecosystems which are ecologically important and/or
irreversibly lost if destroyed (Group 1). At the other extreme there are
ecosystems which are not ecologically important or are replaceable (Group 3).
Between these two extremes there are ecosystems which are ecologically
important, but non-essential, and can be partially restored if lost (Group 2).
King examines a number of approaches for measuring ‘importance’ and
‘reversibility’ of natural capital if lost, and hence ecosystem classification. King
also notes that the allocation of particular ecosystems to specific Groups will be
made with due regard to political and economic debate, and not only scientific
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considerations. It is also appropriate that this debate considers the expected life
span of the ecosystem, and hence whether a decline in ecosystem health is a
result of the system approaching the end of its life.
In the context of this paper, the three groups of ecosystems can be thought of
as referring to different types of parks that require, in order, decreasing levels of
ecosystem preservation as a result of them being reversible if destroyed: World
Heritage Areas (Group 1 parks); National Parks and reserves (Group 2 parks);
provincial and local parks and reserves (Group 3 parks). Alternatively, the
groupings could be applied to separate areas within a specific park: a core zone
(Group 1 park ecosystems) that contains the most ecologically important
ecosystems and is irreversibly lost if destroyed; a buffer zone (Group 2 park
ecosystems) that is adjacent to the core; and a transition zone (Group 3 park
ecosystems) that is adjacent to non-park land. For the purposes of the remainder
of this article the latter naming system will be used to refer to both ecosystems
within a single park and different types of park.
6 Appropriate policy mix for recreational user management
If a downward trend in park ecosystem health is deemed to be attributable to
the detrimental impact of recreational users, the implementation of the
appropriate policy mix for the management of recreational users is required. The
management techniques available depend upon the group to which the park
ecosystem belongs. This section discusses, with reference to the equity of
access guiding principle and the park ecosystem classification, where it is
appropriate to use market incentives as a management tool to reduce the
detrimental impact of recreational users on park ecosystem health, and where
non-market techniques are important (for a wider discussion of recreation
management techniques see Hammitt and Cole, 1987). It is not intended for this
section to be a survey of all the available policy options to determine a particular
least cost policy option for each park ecosystem type. This is because the
determination of a least cost policy mix option is an empirically based modelling
exercise only appropriate at the level of individual park sites, based upon the
park’s level of ecosystem health, and current and potential mix and levels of
activities and techniques undertaken by recreational users.
As the reader will recall from Section 4 the detrimental impact of recreational
users on a park ecosystem is determined by the level of P, V and T, with the
latter being a function of A, Q, S and W.
To ensure as much freedom of choice as possible for individual recreational
users, I suggest that policies for reducing the detrimental impact of recreational
users on park ecosystems should concentrate upon, in order of descending
priority: increasing W; reducing A; reducing Q; reducing V; and reducing P. As a
result, S will, intertemporally, be reduced.
A number of non-market and market based management techniques can be
used to reduce T. It is likely that a least cost policy will to reducing T will be a mix
of non-market and market based management approaches.
Non-market based management techniques that directly reduce A and Q,
increase W and, intertemporally, reduce S include: moral suasion approaches;
‘minimal impact usage’ education programs for users; and site hardening
through the introduction of such things as ‘board walks’ and gravel paths. These
approaches could, in principle, be used in all three ecosystem groups. However,
extensive use of site hardening in Group 1 park ecosystems is undesirable for it
is likely to directly reduce the park ecosystem health.
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Common (1995) notes that moral suasion is not usually considered by
economists as an inappropriate policy option, primarily because it undermines
consumer sovereignty by implying that individual’s preferences are wrong.
Common notes that appropriately undertaken moral suasion is worthy of
consideration in ecological economic policy formulation. There are two major
benefits of employing education and moral suasion as means of encouraging
recreational users to reduce T: (1) freedom of choice is preserved, or at least
perceived freedom of choice in the face of moral suasion; and perhaps more
importantly (2) the alteration of individual behaviour can occur quickly and
profoundly. The ‘Tread Lightly!’ campaign, initiated in the USA in 1989, is an
excellent example of this type of education and moral suasion exercise directed
at recreational users (Scudmore, 1996). ‘Tread Lightly!’ attempts to make
individuals aware that: “(i) almost all damage to the environment is caused
through a lack of knowledge; and (ii) teaching folk how to prevent this is better
than banning them” (Scudmore, 1996 pp. 14). A minimal impact strategy,
comprising best minimal impact practices, codes and ethics for all outdoor
recreational pursuits, is currently being developed on a national basis with inputs
from major stakeholders.
Given the criterion upon which ecosystems were classified in Section 5, it is
appropriate that the permitted activities and techniques for undertaking activities
should vary between the groups. For Group 1 park ecosystems, only minimal
impact uses, as defined in guiding principle 3, can be allowed. This is because
Group 1 park ecosystems are ecologically important and/or are irreversible lost
if destroyed. Progressively more damaging activities and techniques can be
pursued in park ecosystem Groups 2 and 3, respectively. The extent to which
more damaging activities and techniques can be employed in park ecosystem
Groups 2 and 3 will depend upon their respective ecological importance, level of
park ecosystem stress at the beginning of the current period, and ability to be
repaired/replaced, naturally or with human intervention, if damaged/destroyed.
These two park ecosystem Groups will be considered together here. However, it
should be noted that when the least cost policy mix is being developed for an
individual park ecosystem site policy should reflect the importance of the
ecosystem and the degree of irreversibility if lost, which will in turn influence the
permitted activities and techniques.
The extent to which market mechanisms can be employed in the three park
ecosystem groups will now be explored, together with further examination of the
use of non-market approaches.
Group 1 park ecosystems
As discussed above only minimal impact uses can be allowed for Group 1
park ecosystems. Given that guiding principle 3 requires equity of access, it is
inappropriate to use market incentives to reduce the detrimental impact on park
ecosystems via a reduction in the user population or the number of visits per
capita of the user population in the current period. Therefore a quota approach
should be applied to reduce, for equity reasons: visits per capita of the user
population first; the user population second, if the detrimental impact on the
ecosystem continues to reduce park ecosystem health when the visits per capita
of the user population in the current period is one. A random draw lottery is an
equitable method for determining individuals or groups of individuals in the user
population that may have park access in the current period. There is no role for
market mechanisms in the management of Group 1 park ecosystems.
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Group 2 and Group 3 park ecosystems
For Group 2 and Group 3 park ecosystems, it is possible to reduce the
detrimental impact on the ecosystem by a reduction in the quantity of damage
done to the ecosystem due to the technology employed per visit. If minimal
impact uses are currently being undertaken, the management approaches for
Group 1 park ecosystems should be adopted.
The reader will recall from Section 3 that revenue raised from non-minimal
impact users was considered to be an appropriate source of funding for the
provision of park management. This will now be considered in conjunction with
addressing the issue of park ecosystem damage reduction.
Market incentives can be used to reduce the detrimental impact on park
ecosystems due to the technology employed per visit (T) by: (1) altering the mix
of activities pursued per visit towards those more benign with respect to
ecosystem health (reducing A); and/or (2) altering the mix of techniques
employed in each activity towards those more benign with respect to ecosystem
health (reducing Q); (3) adoption of management techniques that decreasing the
detrimental impact of each technique on ecosystem health.
To explore the use of market and non-market approaches the following
discussion will consider some methods for reducing the detrimental impact on
park ecosystems of one activity: the recreational use of off-road recreational
vehicles (ORVs), arguably one of the most damaging recreational activities (see
Webb and Wilshire, 1983 for a wider discussion of the environmental impacts
and management of ORVs).
To alter the mix of activities pursued per visit it is appropriate to charge a user
fee, or increase the fee if none currently exists, for the recreational use of ORVs.
Charging users on a per time block (eg. hourly, half-day, weekend) and/or per
track use basis would be an appropriate approach (Marriott, 1993). This will
encourage users to seek cheaper substitutes and alternatives eg. undertake the
same activity on land that is not important ecologically, if a lower use fee is
charged, or switch to other activities such as canoeing or walking. As the latter
activities are comparatively benign with respect to ecosystem health, a low or no
charge would be associated with these activities. It would be appropriate to
charge a higher use fee for ORV use on Group 2 park ecosystems than on
Group 3 park ecosystems. If ORV use becomes elitist as the charge for use
increases, it can be argued on equity of access grounds (guiding principle 3)
that the use of ORV s should be prohibited. If rich ORV users foresaw such a
situation, it may be in their own best interests to directly or indirectly subsidise
poor ORV users who could not afford the high use fees. In terms of total user
access to ORV activities, although such schemes would be a zero-sum game in
the presence of scarce use rights, they ensure the guiding principle of equity of
access is addressed, while securing continued access of rich ORV users, as a
group, to this activity. Perhaps the easiest of all such subsidising schemes to
monitor is for local, regional or national ORV user associations to sponsor ORV
tours open to underprivileged individuals nominated by suitable charity
organisations. The Park Management Board would need to monitor such a
scheme.
A variety of market mechanisms exist to alter the mix of techniques employed
in the recreational use of ORVs towards those which are more benign with
respect to ecosystem health. Two are noted. (1) A lower price per passenger
could be charged the greater the number of passengers per vehicle, to
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encourage users to share vehicles. (2) Access to ORV tracks could be restricted
to particular users, through the issuing of licences for which a fee would be
charged. Regulations attached to licences would stipulate the manner in which
ORV use could be undertaken eg. no off-track driving, minimum number of
passengers per vehicle, maximum number of visits per period, the requirement
for licence holder to periodically attend or pass a training course in minimum
impact driving, etc. A use fee per visit is also required in this system.
To reduce the damage done to the ecosystem from any specific technique
employed in the recreational use of ORVs differential pricing can be applied to
tracks, to reflect the scarcity value for potential use. High licence fees and/or use
fees should be charged for tracks under stress. Again, if there is a tendency for
the use of these tracks to become elitist, the use of ORVs should be prohibited
on equity grounds. Again, rich ORV users may wish to subsidise poor ORV
users to prevent prohibition of use.
Damage to an ecosystem from any specific technique of ORV usage can also
be achieved by non-market based management techniques, such as the rotation
of tracks available for use to reduce stress on tracks or specific track closure
during fauna breeding seasons.
Monitoring
Monitoring of the behaviour of recreational users and their impact is vital for
successful management. Where possible a policy that encourages self-
monitoring of users, as individuals and as a group, should be encouraged. This
makes users responsible for their own actions as well as for monitoring and
influencing ecosystem health damaging behaviour of other users directly, or
indirectly through the reporting of the user and their behaviour to park authorities.
Self-monitoring of recreational users will also be a low cost approach to
monitoring the behaviour of recreational users, compared with extensive use of
ranger patrols, for example. It should be noted that to be effective a self-
monitoring approach should be actively supported by the park authority via
proactive user education and close liaison with major user groups, and hence
will not be a monitoring approach that incurs zero financial costs.
The cost of monitoring the behaviour of recreational users in each of the Group
2 and Group 3 park ecosystems are likely to be greater than that incurred in
Group 1 park ecosystems. There are two reason for this. First, multiple activities
and techniques are permitted in Group 2 and Group 3 park ecosystems, while
only the minimal impact activity and technique are permitted in Group 1 park
ecosystems. Second, and stemming from the first, there are likely to be greater
numbers of recreational users in Group 2 and Group 3 park ecosystems than
Group 1 park ecosystems.
6.Summary and conclusions
When contributing to policy recommendations for the management of specific
stocks of natural capital, such as ecosystems within publicly owned parks and
reserves, ecological economics can provide a framework for sustainability.
A constrained park management goal has been proposed here that allows
recreational users to pursue welfare derived from park experiences, subject to
non-declining ecosystem health and equity of access.
Where the decline in park ecosystem health results from the detrimental
impact of recreational users, policies are required to reduce this impact.
Resulting from a suggested set of guiding principles, Table 1 summarises the
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extent to which there is a role for non-market and market mechanisms in
reducing the detrimental impact of recreational users on park ecosystems. It was
found that non-market mechanisms alone are suitable in Group 1 park
ecosystems, with market mechanisms being of increasing importance use in
Group 2 and Group 3 park ecosystems. The priority order in which the policy
tools should be applied, to ensure maximum freedom of choice for individual
recreational users, is also included.
It has been stressed that control of recreational user management should lie
with the community, via Park Management Boards and that the least cost policy
mix to achieve the constrained management goal should be pursued. It remains
for ecological economics to determine the appropriate mechanisms for the
establishment of such Boards and for appropriate policy mixes at the level of
individual parks. Given the demands upon park ecosystems, it is unlikely that
sustainability will be achievable without effective proactive recreational user
management.
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Table 1
Policy tools to reduce detrimental impact of recreational users on park
ecosystems
Park Ecosystem
Group 1 Group 2 and Group 3
Ecologically important
&/or irreversibly lost if
destroyed
ææææÆ
Ecologically unimportant &/or can be
repaired if destroyed
Determinants
of detrimental
recreational
user impact
(I)a
Policy tool Priority Policy tool Priority
User
population (P)
NMMb eg.
random draw
lottery
Third NMM eg. random draw
lottery
Fifth
Visits per
capita of user
population (V)
NMM eg.
random draw
lottery
Second NMM eg. random draw
lottery
Fourth
Activity
malignancy
index (A)
N/Ad MMc eg. use fees
NMM eg. open track
rotation, site hardening
Third
Technique
malignancy
index (Q)
N/Ad MM eg. licence fees (tied
to NMM), differential use
fees to reflect stress level
NMM eg. open track
rotation, site hardening
Second
Awareness
index (W)
NMM ie.
Education &
moral
suasion
First NMM ie. Education &
moral suasion
First
a Stress is not identified for policies cannot reduce stress in the current period.
b Non-market mechanism.
c Market mechanism.
d No policy tool necessary as minimal impact activity and technique is the only
permitted recreational use.
